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“It all happened so slowly” – on controlling function creep in 
forensic DNA databases.   
 
 
Forensic DNA databases are implemented worldwide and used increasingly. Part of this 
increasing usage is arguably a matter of function creep. Function creep refers to changes in, 
and especially additions to, the use of a technology. In this article we explore the notion of 
function creep as we discuss why and how it has taken place on forensic DNA databases. We 
also consider what future function creep it is possible to envisage. As even security enhancing 
technologies may contribute to insecurities, what safeguards should be in place to render 
function creep governable? We use the Norwegian DNA database, expanded considerably as 
recently as September 2008, as our primary case for discussion. Additionally we use examples 
from the English and Welsh DNA database which, considered world leading, may be an 
indication of where other DNA databases are heading. The article isn‘t data-driven but draws 
on a wide spectrum of data: governmental documents, public and Parliamentary debates, and 
interviews.  
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“It all happened so slowly” – On controlling function creep in 
forensic DNA databases. 
 
”Asking questions about the process of surveillance creep and possible latent goals should be 
a central part of any public policy discussion of surveillance before it is introduced. Beyond 
determining if a proposed tactic is morally and legally acceptable, works relative to 
alternatives and can be competently applied, it is appropriate to ask, once the foot is in the 
door, where might it lead?” (Marx 1988: 387)   
 
This is an article about function creep in the use of forensic DNA-databases. Function creep 
refers to changes in, and especially additions to, the use of a technology. When personal data, 
collected and used for one purpose and to fulfill one function have migrated to others that 
extend and intensify surveillance and invasion of privacy beyond what was originally 
understood and considered socially, ethically and legally acceptable
1
 it is known as function 
creep. The term is frequently used when discussing surveillance technologies or surveillance 
uses of technologies with other purported primary goals. One of many surveillance 
technologies that has been subjected to function creep is forensic DNA databases. Since DNA 
was first used in forensics during the mid 80s, it has been used increasingly, and forensic 
DNA databases have been and are still being established and developed all over the world. 
Not only that, but: ―No country has yet ever reduced its established forensic DNA collection 
or sought to curtail its uses once it has been embedded successfully into its criminal justice 
system‖ (Williams and Johnson 2005: 16). While the use of DNA in forensics in the 
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http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/surveillance_society_full
_report_2006.pdf (last accessed 16.10.08) p 9  
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beginning was considered quite controversial, there has been a trend that legal restrictions 
regarding forensic DNA databases have been loosened – function creep has taken place.  
 
One of the main reasons for this function creep is that forensic DNA technology is considered 
an efficient tool in criminal justice matters, one that contributes to increased security. In this 
article we will look at: Why and how does function creep occur? Why, when and how might 
we wish to prevent or stall it? What function creep has taken place on (the Norwegian) 
forensic DNA database, and through what processes? What future function creep is it possible 
to envisage? And, as even technologies implemented to increase security may contribute to 
insecurity (Aas et al. 2008); what safeguards should be in place to render function creep 
governable? First we will dig deeper into the concept of function creep, then we move on to 
present the data that the article is drawing from and some methodological reflections, before 
we present some of the function creep that has taken place in relation to forensic DNA 
databases and what safeguards we consider beneficial to enable a fairly governed DNA 
database. The use of the Norwegian forensic DNA database was recently expanded 
considerably; therefore it will be used as a case for our discussion. However, as Williams and 
Johnson (2004a: 9) write, the history of the UK National DNA Database (the NDNAD) is a 
history of continuous expansion. The NDNAD is considered one of the leading, if not the 
leading, forensic DNA database in the world. Norwegian authorities have pointed to the UK 
and sought to follow in the UK‘s footsteps. Thus, even from a Norwegian perspective, we 
consider it helpful to use examples from the NDNAD in our discussion, not least as an 
indication of where the Norwegian forensic DNA database might be heading.  
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1. Function creep: What is the concept? 
 
Fox (2001: 261) defines function creep as ―previously authorised arrangements … now being 
applied to purposes and targets beyond those envisaged at the time of installation‖. While 
function creep may be the most common term, several others are used to describe the same, or 
nearly the same phenomenon. Surveillance creep is one such. Marx (1988) writes:  
 
“As powerful new surveillance tactics are developed, the range of their legitimate and 
illegitimate use is likely to spread. Where there is a way, there is often a will. There is 
the danger of an almost imperceptible surveillance creep” (Marx 1988:2).  
 
Seventeen years later, in 2005, the term is as relevant as ever and Marx writes: 
  
“A fascinating aspect of surveillance technologies as hegemonic control involves their 
tendency to expand to new goals, agents, subjects and forms. The surveillance appetite 
once aroused can be insatiable. A social process of surveillance creep (and sometimes 
gallop) can often be seen. Here a tool introduced for a specific purpose comes to be 
used for other purposes, as those with the technology realize its potential and ask, 
„Why not?‟”(Marx 2005: 386).  
 
Innes uses the term control creep and defines it as follows:  
 
“Control creep captures the sense in which the apparatus of social control, that is the 
combination of technologies and instruments designed to respond and to regulate 
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deviant behavior, are becoming increasingly dispersed and interspersed throughout 
many different arenas of late-modern social life” (Innes 2001: 2).  
 
With this Innes (2001: 2) intends to “Capture something more profound, than just an 
expansion in the monitoring of social life” as covered by Marx‘ (1988) term surveillance 
creep.  
 
Williams and Johnson (2008: 82) uses both function creep and control creep and writes as 
follows: “… describes how a government‟s programme of technological intervention into 
social life is gradually, incrementally, but deliberately, increased over time‖. 
 
All the terms refer to function change, especially expansion, and especially expansion of 
surveillance and control functions. All include the word ―creep‖. While not all function 
expansions are ―creepy‖2, we do have these terms for function expansion that are negatively 
loaded, carrying a hint of ―sneakiness‖. We see this as in part referring to the social effects of 
certain functions, in part to the process through which they were implemented, and in part to 
interactions between effects and implementation process.  
 
The declared function of these technologies – surveillance – can sometimes be regarded as 
―creepy‖ in itself, a sneaky peering into others‘ lives the better to control them. But 
surveillance and social control are also necessary, often positive, aspects of society. The 
challenge, then, is to define and maintain acceptable forms and levels of surveillance and 
social control. Sometimes the addition of a new function to a technology is, all things 
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 Webster‘s Encyclopaedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1994: 342) ‖1. that creeps, as an 
insect. 2. having or causing a creeping sensation of the skin, as from horror or fear.‖ 
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considered, a good thing. How we categorize a function expansion is a value judgment. The 
next question, then, is how we go about making such judgments.  
 
―Creep‖ can refer to a secretive, sneaky process of change. How democratic or undemocratic 
the function implementation process has been may also be linked to the outcomes -- how we 
see a given function as affecting distributions of power, autonomy, knowledge, access to 
resources. But the term may also simply refer to slow, crawl-paced change, which may be a 
good thing as it allows time for reflection, debate, and democratic process. So not all function 
expansion warrants a derogatory term, but ―creep‖ need not always be derogatory. The term 
function creep may in a given case refer to the skin-crawling, chilling nature of the latest 
added function and/or the sneakiness of an undemocratic, secretive process of socio-technical 
change … but it may also simply refer to slow, considered, and accepted change. In this 
article we will focus primarily on process and the consequences of process for outcomes. We 
have chosen to use the term ―function creep‖ with its ambivalent implications – potentially 
both positive and negative – rather than ―surveillance creep‖ or ―control creep‖ where the 
power aspects of ―surveillance‖ and ―control‖ highlight the negative implications of ―creep‖. 
 
Function change and expansion occur because they can. They occur because technologies are 
interpretatively flexible (Bijker 1995) and their users imaginative and creative (Oudshoorn 
and Pinch 2003). Surveillance technologies are socio-technical systems for gathering, storing, 
accessing and analyzing information (so: information systems) about the appearances, 
communications and actions of human subjects. Information systems are considered to be 
among the most interpretatively flexible (Bijker 1996). Information systems are highly 
flexible because not only can their material tools (computers, routers, servers, screens) be 
used in multiple ways, but so too can their information content. Regarding DNA, genetic 
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information is already used for medical diagnostics and research, paternity testing, forensic 
identification, inferring prehistoric migration routes … and further future uses have been 
predicted. The material structures of the databases can serve to safeguard DNA information or 
to share it, to aggregate it or to search out individual cases, and so on.  
 
1.1 OK, functions creep. What are “functions”? 
The term function is used in many contexts with slightly different implications. One context 
relevant here is information technology (IT) engineering. For IT engineers, defining the 
functional parameters of a proposed IT system is a routine task. In this context we meet a 
fairly simple, almost mechanical definition of function: a segment of program that carries out 
a particular movement of data – register, code, store, search, collate, print -- as represented in 
the iconography of task and/or information flow charts (see e.g. Bræk et al. 1982). This 
definition says little or nothing about what the data are used for or to what social effects. 
 
When the data registered are personal data, data protection laws come into play. Here we meet 
a second meaning of function in the form of a synonym: purpose. One of the basic tenets of 
data protection laws is that data collected for one purpose may not be used for any other 
purpose without seeking new consent and/or concessions/permits (see Norway‘s Personal 
Data Act, Ch. II, section 11, §§b and c
3
). This too is a rather formalistic, almost mechanical 
definition, and one that is critiqued from two sides. In the case of medical research those who 
gather and use personal data are often frustrated by the rigidity of this rule, claiming that 
potentially valuable data analyses and reports are hampered by it (Hofmann 2005). At the 
same time, privacy advocates find the rule inadequate, since many data usages they perceive 
as qualitatively new and different, can nevertheless be characterized as serving an already 
                                                 
3
 http://www.datatilsynet.no/upload/Dokumenter/regelverk/lov_forskrift/lov-20000414-031-eng.pdf 
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established purpose. When a DNA-database initially presented as a tool for solving serious 
crimes is expanded to cover volume crimes, is that a new purpose or still the same one: Catch 
as many criminals as possible? 
 
Taking privacy advocates‘ point into consideration, we might want to move our definition 
towards a sociological understanding of function. Without committing ourselves to a 
Structural-Functionalist standpoint, we can say that in Sociology more broadly the function(s) 
of a social phenomenon (an artifact, a practice, an institution, etc.) is/are the social effect(s) of 
that phenomenon Within Structural-Functionalism, function (as opposed to dysfunction) 
refers more specifically to effects that contribute to the continuity and cohesion of society, 
which in turn is presumed to be a desirable outcome (Mathiesen 2001: 277). But the concept 
is also used more broadly, including in more conflictual views of society (Mathiesen 2001: 
277), to be any effects on the social fabric. Incorporating this view into the two above, we can 
say that each function of an information system, such as a DNA database, is a data processing 
routine with some social effect(s). These effects may be positive or negative or mixed, 
negligible or dramatic, and there may be no consensus as to which.  
 
That brings us to one last point: When is a function new? Given the definition we have 
chosen, we could say that a function is new when its social effects are new, but that does not 
entirely solve the problem. After all, there may not be consensus on that issue. But perhaps 
that is an adequate definition nonetheless. It leaves the matter in the arena of political 
discourse, which may be precisely where it belongs. A function is new when a data-
processing routine or goal is added, subtracted, or changed to a degree that arguably has new 
social effects. Those who perceive a function as changed, are then left the task of arguing that 
point. There are, however, some signposts that might signal a functional change, such as when 
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a given data-processing routine requires dispensation from current regulations, or breaks with 
a promise used to gain acceptance for the database in the first place. 
 
1.2 Technology is neither good nor bad … nor is it neutral 4  
 
It can be taken as given that no technology is ever perfectly good or perfectly evil (Collins 
and Pinch 1994:150). ―Although there is no doubt that the benefits of technological progress 
have vastly improved human conditions in many ways, technology also carries risks‖ (Yuthas 
and Dillard 199: 48). Even technologies implemented for security-enhancement may 
contribute to not only security, but insecurities as well (Aas et al. 2009). Zedner (2009: 263) 
makes this point using the example of ―The Sorcerer‘s Apprentice‖5:  
 
“Policy makers may act as modern-day wizards conjuring new technological alchemy 
as the magical charms with which to cure the ills of the contemporary world. But as 
the Sorcerer‟s Apprentice learned the hard way, these spells may prove more powerful 
and less controllable than their makers anticipate – less charm one might say than 
hex. The temptation to seek technological solutions is rarely accompanied by sufficient 
anticipation of the fact that technologies may develop unpredictably or be subverted in 
ways that render them greater sources of insecurity than security.”  
  
This capacity for good and/or evil does not reside in the technologies alone. Technologies do 
not determine their own fates. Technologies are only used when they are perceived (at least 
                                                 
4
 Kranzberg‘s first law of technology (Kranzberg 1986). 
5
 Most readers will be familiar with the Disney version of this tale, in which Mickey Mouse casts a spell so that 
the broom will do his sweeping chores for him, but then loses control. 
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by some) as producing desirable results. But this need not imply that technology 
implementation and outcomes are results of some sort of conspiracy. While human choices 
are certainly consequential, technologies have material properties that are amenable to certain 
uses and resistant to others, including some that may come as surprises to us all. 
―Unanticipated uses and side effects of innovations can never be fully foreseen or controlled, 
and technologies we use today can have serious consequences for individuals separated from 
us by great expanses of time and space. Although the risks can never be eliminated, we must 
own up to their possibility and make serious attempts to anticipate and control them‖ (Yuthas 
and Dillard 1999:48).  
 
Garland (1995) argues that surveillance technologies are essential and inevitable in complex 
societies. In his view, they are not themselves the problem; rather, the issue is how they can 
be regulated to avoid abuse. While it is almost certainly impossible to foresee, let alone 
prevent, all future applications of a given new technology, we consider it worthwhile to 
discuss how such expansion might be governed. The main goal of the article is to discuss: 
What safeguards need to be in place to govern forensic DNA databases?  
 
2.  Methods 
Function creep evolves over time. Therefore the past, the present and the future are all 
relevant for discussing it. Looking from the past to the present enables us to see what kind of 
changes have taken place in the usage of forensic DNA databases. However, wanting to 
debate how to govern function creep not only at the moment, but also with an eye to the 
consequences of our decisions, we need to try to raise our gaze from the present to the future. 
We agree with Haggerty (2009) that interests in surveillance have solidified a belief that we 
must seriously consider what lies ahead if we are to advance towards collective goals, or 
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recognize looming disasters. Our article is not an exercise in prediction, but a reflection on 
possible alternative futures. 
 
As the past, present and future are all relevant for this article we see the need to draw on a 
large spectrum of data, all various forms of texts arts. The data include governmental 
documents (White Papers from Norway and reports from the British Home Office), public 
and Parliamentary debates, and interviews with Norwegian and British stakeholders in the 
DNA debate; lawyers, police, politicians, privacy interests, expert witnesses and DNA-
laboratory workers. A total of 30 informants were interviewed. The use of governmental 
documents as data enables us to view aspects of the debate (or lack of it) regarding DNA-
databasing and expansions of it.  The informants for the interviews are a strategic sample, 
chosen on the basis that they were knowledgeable on the subject and represented a variety of 
perspectives on the use of DNA-databasing.  The interviews were semi-structured. This 
provided the opportunity that both the informant and the interviewer could influence the 
direction of the interview. This is particularly important when talking about possible future 
events because what one thinks will happen in the future is very individual. 
 
In spite of drawing on a wide spectrum of data, this is not a data-driven article. Rather it is 
driven by our understanding of function creep – why it occurs and how it might be controlled. 
We are using our data not to test hypotheses or claims, nor to establish predictive rules, nor to 
measure the relative strengths of various function creep drivers and controlling instruments. 
Rather, we use the data eclectically to illustrate what we think are clear instances and 
circumstances of function creep and thereby to propose potential means of governing it. More 
stringent tests of our proposals may be appropriate in future research. 
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While the Norwegian DNA database is the main case of the article, we use data about the UK 
NDNAD as a comparison case, since it is used as a reference point – be it as inspiration or 
object of criticism – not only in Norway but also by stakeholders in many other countries 
(Williams and Johnson 2008).  
 
3. Why function creep takes place and some of the 
safeguards we need to govern it  
Function creep occurs through a number of mechanisms. For instance, we often see 
technologies introduced when conditions are taken to indicate a dire need, then gradually 
expanded into less urgent usages. This need not come about conspiratorially. It may also 
come about in spite of everyone‘s best intentions, for instance through uncritical optimism 
and because the moral terrain shifts as soon as the initial investment is made. Once a 
technology is in place, it becomes wasteful not to use it to the fullest acceptable limit. Usages 
that might not have been sufficiently legitimate for initial implementation do have sufficient 
legitimacy to be tacked on later. In other words, there is no need to shout ―Wolf! Wolf!‖ We 
do not need to assume a conspiracy. The best of intentions may lead us in directions and 
distances we, in retrospect, did not wish to go.  
 
So let us assume good intentions. Obviously, good intentions are insufficient as a means of 
controlling the spread and direction of function expansion. So what measures can we take to 
support our good intentions? In the following we will discuss what safeguards – or measures – 
that might be helpful to govern forensic DNA databases. For each measure we will also 
discuss examples showing how, why, when these have been used or might advantageously 
have been used. None of these measures would of themselves guarantee a ―good‖ outcome. 
 14 
Not only do we need to combine measures because each has its own innate weaknesses, but 
we also need to accept that in the final analysis we may not all agree on what outcomes are 
―good‖. While we are aware that no degree of democracy can insure a perfect society, we 
aspire to look for ways to make the process of technology development, including function 
expansion, more democratic and less ―creepy‖.  
 
3.1 Assess necessity and effectiveness  
In Norway all work preparatory to official reforms and changes in laws or regulations has to 
follow specific instructions. The instructions are intended to ensure that financial, 
administrative and other significant consequences of reforms and measures are clarified. The 
instructions are also meant to ensure that institutions responsible for the matter assess all 
relevant and significant consequences, and that stakeholders and the general public are 
included in the decision-making process before a decision is made (Instructions for Official 
Studies and Reports 2005). These instructions have been followed in the process of expanding 
the Norwegian DNA database. But while this is a comfortingly democratic process, it may 
nevertheless be a flawed one. Democracy needs to be used actively lest complacency allow 
decisions to pass that we would not have accepted had we thought them through. 
 
One of the main arguments made by Norwegian politicians in promoting expansion of the 
Norwegian forensic DNA database has been its purported efficiency in solving crimes. In a 
press release, the Ministry of Justice (2007) stated that no method can outperform DNA, 
neither when it comes to efficiency nor credibility and that it is necessary for the Norwegian 
police to have efficient tools like police elsewhere. Repeatedly, DNA advocates predict that 
DNA will contribute to increased detection of a variety of crimes from volume crime, serious 
crime, organized crime, national as well as international crime. Consequently, increased use 
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of DNA will free up police resources.  Moreover, the ability to detect more crime will 
contribute to increased levels of security (Storberget 2007).  
 
We don‘t doubt that the use of forensic DNA databases may be useful and effective, but it 
may not be as efficient as claimed. It has been claimed in official documents
6
 and debates in 
the Odelsting
7
 that detection rates on volume property crime in the UK increased from 14 to 
45 percent where the DNA database could be used. Through this and similar arguments using 
statistics it becomes evident that Norwegian politicians have read reports from the British 
Home Office such as the ―DNA Expansion Programme 2000-2005: Reporting achievement‖ 
and been seduced by the apparently impressive statistics. Where Norwegian politicians have 
erred, however, is in comparing the general detection rate to the detection rate where the 
NDNAD was used (Dahl and Lomell forthcoming). Equating the two gives a deceptive 
impression that the general detection rate will increase dramatically by expanding the DNA 
database. What the numbers actually show is that in 2004/05 there were 5,6 million recorded 
crimes in UK. Of these, 913 717 were subject to crime scene detection, which resulted in 
49 723 crime scene DNA profiles being added to the NDNAD. Even assuming one profile per 
crime scene, DNA was only loaded from 0,88% of crime scenes. It is in this 0.88%, that a 
40% detection rate was reported. I.e. only 0,35% of crimes were detected using DNA 
(GeneWatch 2006a: 8). In the Norwegian debate there appears to be a lack of mathematical 
competence, perhaps exacerbated by technology optimism and a lack of skepticism, a lack of 
critical reflection regarding who are the providers of these numbers and what their objectives 
may be.  
 
                                                 
6
 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2007/auka-bruk-av-dna-for-a-oppklare-
meir.html?id=482547 
7
 The chamber of the Parliament that proposes new laws. 
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This example illustrates how the forensic DNA database is subjected to an expansion and 
function creep as a result of a political investment, and how one of the most often used forms 
of arguments, statistics, is flawed (Dahl and Lomell forthcoming). This shows how important 
it is that necessity and effectiveness are evaluated before, but also during the use of forensic 
DNA databases. It also shows how important it is that such evaluations are done by 
organizations without self interest in the results. When implementing any technology, forensic 
DNA databases included, it is important to have procedures for function evaluation – pre- and 
post-implementation.  
 
Furthermore, not only initial implementations should be thoroughly evaluated. If we wish to 
govern function creep, each additional function should be discussed, not only regarding 
necessity and effectiveness, but also according to ethical questions. It is important that new 
functions are evaluated and discussed publicly. Merton (1942) points out how ―organized 
skepticism‖ is a key element in the practice of science, helping science to avoid, catch, and 
correct its humanly inevitable errors. We might say the same of democratic society as a 
whole.  
3.2 Laws and regulations 
Democracies are based not only in debate, but also in law. Norway‘s oldest codified laws – 
the 13
th
 century Frostatingsloven – include the sentence, a familiar motto to this day: ―Med 
lov skal landet byggjast, og ikkje med ulov oydast‖ [Through law shall the nation be built, 
and not by unlawfulness destroyed.]. This faith in the law as a guarantor of justice, fairness, 
and social stability is characteristic of democratic societies in general, not only of Norway.  
 
We have already seen above that the law requires some degree of reflection and some balance 
between conflicting interests before taking the first step towards implementing a new 
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technology of such proportions as a national forensic DNA database. That process of 
consideration may point out some number of concerns and misgivings about the new 
technology. Frequently we see that such concerns are ―met‖ by proposing that implementation 
of the new technology be contingent on certain legal restraints. Yes, we will have a national 
DNA database, but the law will limit who will be registered, who will have access to the 
database, what purposes the database will serve, and so on.  
 
In Norway, as in most other countries, a number of laws and regulations govern the forensic 
DNA database, for example when it may be used and who may be registered. When the 
database was first established in 1999 the law only allowed registration of people convicted of 
severe crimes, such as murder, sexual offences, robbery and grievous bodily harm. A White 
Paper (NOU 1993:31) concluded that including people convicted of these crimes would be 
appropriate and sufficient and that the main goal was ―that the detection rate will become as 
high as possible when it comes to punishable actions, and naturally especially when it comes 
to severe crimes that threaten other peoples‘ life and health‖ (NOU 1993:31 p 7, our 
translation). In 2005, 12 years later, a new White Paper concludes that there is a need to 
expand the Norwegian DNA database (NOU 2005:19). This expansion is also linked to an 
expansion of its goal. Now it is to be used also in the fight against ―volume crime‖8. As of 
September 2008 it is no longer only people convicted of serious crimes who may be 
registered, but anyone convicted of a crime that may lead to imprisonment
9
. This could 
include people convicted of speeding, white-collar crime, and draft-dodging. People suspected 
of crimes, but not convicted, are to be registered on an investigation database that may be 
searched against the evidence database.  
 
                                                 
8
 http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/JD/Vedlegg/Faktaark/DNA_reform_web.pdf 
9
 However, fear of having an explosion of cases to deal with has lead to regulations that only people convicted to 
imprisonment for over 60 days will be registered for the time being (Riksadvokaten 2008).  
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What are the social effects of such a change? ―DNA profiling and DNA banking enable the 
construction of ‗closed circuit‘ of surveillance of a defined population‖ (Williams and Jonson 
2004a: 1). Once inside the database, you are constantly on a ―virtual line-up‖ of potential 
suspects. The larger the database, the larger the portion of the population subjected to this 
more or less constant surveillance. The larger the scope of crimes that lead to searches of the 
database, the more frequently such surveillance takes place. The boundaries of the database 
and its usage also become a form of social differentiation between a ―We, the normal, trusted 
citizens‖ and a ―They, the Others, the non-trustworthy‖. Who falls within this defined 
population that is subjected to such ―bio-surveillance‖ (Williams and Jonson 2004a) has 
expanded dramatically in less than the nine years that the Norwegian DNA database has been 
operational. At work is a very familiar process whereby legal restrictions are loosened to be 
able to use a surveillance technology more (Haggerty and Ericson 2006: 19) and laws and 
regulations are pushed to obtain desired goals.  
 
In Norway acquitted suspects are to be removed from the investigation-database. The UK had 
a similar practice until a change allowed indefinite retention of DNA samples. The 
background for this change was the failure to ensure systematic removal of profiles from the 
NDNAD of people who were never convicted. At least 50 000 profiles might have been kept 
unlawfully on the database before the 2001 law was changed (Her Majesty‘s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, 2000). Function creep may happen as a bit of administrative convenience 
(Surveillance Studies Network 2006), and also tends to turn up ad hoc (Haggerty and Ericson 
2006). This expansion of the NDNAD may be an example of both processes. But is there a 
road back in time? While indefinite retention of samples was unacceptable and unlawful when 
the NDNAD was first implemented, objections fade as expansion occurs gradually. As one 
interviewed British DNA-manager said:   
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“I suspect -- this is my personal view -- but had they tried to bring in the current 
legislation back in 1995 they would never have gotten it in. It was far too radical at 
that point. But if you bring it in a limited fashion and say it is only for criminal 
elements and that proves to be extremely successful, then bit by bit you can add on to 
that, which I would say is probably what happened to allow us to get to this point. I do 
say there is probably still a good deal of controversy over keeping profiles related to 
people who have never been charged of anything but who were unfortunate to be in 
the wrong place at the wrong time, because once it is on, getting off the system is not 
easy. But I am quite sure this won‟t change.”  
 
In general, surveillance technologies have been on the rise in recent years (Innes 2001:3). 
DNA is seen as reliable, trustworthy and secure tool. DNA is expected to increase security on 
a micro and macro level; the individual‘s legal protection and society‘s rule of law (Dahl 
2009). Therefore this may also be an example of how security may trump a wide range of 
possible counter-arguments. This is obvious in an interviewed British policeman‘s account of 
why people not convicted of crimes should go on the NDNAD: 
 
“It‟s quite a harsh law to say that we would take and keep DNA from people who have 
never been convicted, but it has proved for us. We have evidence of hundreds of cases 
where DNA has been taken, that have not previously offended. They are first time 
offenders, who have not been convicted before. Yet their DNA is matched against very, 
very serious offences of rape, murder, or whatever. If we had not had this legislation, 
had we not had this law, to take the DNA and to retain it to check it against the 
database, we would have never detected those crimes. Although it could be 
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considered, and I can understand the argument, that it is a very harsh law, it is 
actually worthwhile”.   
 
An equivalent cost benefit analysis, how catching criminals and enhanced security will trump 
any other argument, appears in the National DNA Database Annual Report 2005-2006 (p14): 
 
―The Government appreciates that some people may be concerned about building a 
larger DNA database, particularly where it relates to people who have not been 
proceeded against for an offence. However, it has concluded that any intrusion on 
personal privacy is both necessary and proportionate, to the benefits for victims of 
crime and protecting the public against criminals.‖ 10  
 
Sometimes function creep takes place as new possible uses of technologies emerge that were 
not foreseen at the time of implementation. These often provide new consequences and risks 
(McCartney 2006), not properly accounted for, nor protected against. One such example with 
DNA is familial searching. Familial searching is based on the fact that DNA is inherited from 
our kin and that DNA profiles of blood related individuals are more likely to contain 
similarities than those of unrelated individuals. Familial searching may then provide guidance 
to investigations where a full DNA profile has been obtained from the crime scene sample, 
but where one does not obtain a match when the sample is loaded to a DNA database 
(McCartney 2006: 190 and Williams and Johnson 2008: 73-75). This opens not only for 
surveillance of convicts (or even suspects) but also their families. As this was not anticipated 
when forensic DNA databases were first implemented, no rules and regulations existed for it. 
                                                 
10
 Here we may be seeing how one notion of ―risk‖ rhetorically contributes to security trumping privacy 
interests. Some outcomes are simply seen as so risky (in the sense of potentially harmful)  that no calculable risk 
(in the statistical sense) is acceptable and no calculable ―cost‖ (such as loss of privacy or autonomy) too great if 
it can bring one even marginally closer to zero risk. 
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Even though now well-known in the UK, in Norway even the most recent regulations still 
make no mention of familial searching. A Norwegian policeman said the following about this 
gap: 
”As of today we do not conduct familial searches in the DNA database in Norway. But 
technically speaking there is no obstacle to it. Technically the database solution is 
arranged so that it is doable. But I guess we haven‟t gotten that far when it comes to 
the line of thought around it that it has been on the agenda in Norway yet.”  
 
Here Norway seems to have lost a rare opportunity to regulate an activity before it becomes 
commonplace. This is a shame as other stakeholders claim that once a technological 
development has taken place it is too late to turn back. As a person from the Commission for 
Forensic Medicine said
11, ―That debate [about familial searching] should have been had 
during the early 90‟s or at the end of the 80‟s if we did not want it. But who could have seen it 
coming?―12 
 
An obvious challenge is to keep laws and regulations up to date with technological 
developments. Technological development is seen as moving at a much quicker pace than 
legal change. Thus ―regulatory gaps‖ or ―legal loopholes‖ arise. A Norwegian DNA-
laboratory worker said the following about legal loopholes: “The legislature doesn‟t manage 
to think of all the contingencies. And this isn‟t all that strange, but it means that there are 
quite some special occasions”  While another DNA-laboratory worker expressed the 
following about how he felt the police relate to such legal loopholes: “they read the law the 
way the devil reads the bible (…) They say that that which is not explicitly claimed illegal, is 
                                                 
11
 The Commission for Forensic Medicine is a national commission appointed by the Ministry of Justice. Their 
main task is to ensure quality of forensic medicine expert witnesses‘‘ reports given in criminal law trials.   
12
 Technology-determinist claims such as this also have a function creep-advancing rhetorical effect, but we 
won‘t discuss that further here as we have no specific suggestions as to measures to counteract them, other than 
simply an alert and informed public discourse. 
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legal”.  And at the same time lab staff claimed to be more or less certain that the police had 
cheated them at times to make them do illegal analyses, but covered in a way so that they 
could not really see or say they were illegal.  
 
Regulatory gaps imply that rules and regulations may not be enough to be able to control 
function creep. Writing laws is a slow Parliamentary process, revising them equally slow and 
too rarely addressed. Sunset provisions mandate that a law will expire on a particular date, 
unless it is reauthorized by legislature
13
. It may be applied to an entire legislation or parts of 
it
14
. This is a way to make sure that legislation is reviewed and kept up to date. It is also a way 
of ensuring that usage does not expand uncontrolled. Even so, this is a process that happens 
with years in-between, and not on a day-to day basis. How then might we manage to deal with 
issues and conflicts arising on a day-to-day basis? We will discuss several possible channels 
for this below. 
 
3.3 Ethics committee 
Ethical issues that were not possible to foresee at the time of implementation are bound to 
arise. Rules and regulations may not cover such issues. One way of dealing with ethical issues 
as they arise may be to have an ethics committee to oversee the technology and its 
surrounding practices. Medical biobanks are subject to regulation by ethics committees. These 
evaluate research projects that propose to use data from the biobanks. They also evaluate data 
collection procedures, procedures for withdrawal of personal data, and individual cases of 
                                                 
13
 http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Sunset+provision  
14
 http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/policy/scrutinising-new-regulations/preparing-impact-
assessments/toolkit/page44269.html. Last accessed 16.10.08 
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conflicts concerning biobanking practices. Additionally, ethics committees may give opinions 
on issues that are more a matter of principle
15
.  
 
The UK NDNAD has such a committee – the Ethics Group. The Ethics Group is relatively 
new (since 2007) and has so far had four meetings. From their published minutes
16
 we can see 
that they have discussed such matters as volunteer consent, causes and implications of ethnic 
imbalance in the NDNAD, and routines for handling applications to conduct research on the 
NDNAD. It is impossible to say what effects the implementation of the Ethics Group will 
have, but some critical issues have already been raised. The Nuffield Report (2007) points out 
that the Ethics Group is not as autonomous as one might have wished. The Ethics Group is 
organizationally placed directly under the NDNAD Strategy Board. It is the Strategy Board 
that decides which research proposals will be discussed by the Ethics Group. The Strategy 
Board‘s agenda-setting power is a serious restriction on the Ethics Group‘s autonomy.  
 
Another critique, not raised against the Ethics Group specifically but shedding doubts on the 
effects of regulatory bodies such as ethics review boards more generally, has been framed by 
Pfeffer (2000). Pfeffer found, in her study of the regulation of IVF services and research, that 
the implementation of the Voluntary Licensing Authority (VLA), rather than restricting 
activities, set clinics free to push the envelope. ―In granting licenses and reviewing research 
protocols, the VLA staved off threats to outlaw human embryo research, thereby enabling 
scientists and clinicians to continue manipulating and sometimes destroying human embryos.‖ 
(Pfeffer 2000: 265) 
 
                                                 
15
 For more on the workings of ethics committees, see http://www.etikkom.no/English 
16
 http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/operational-policing/forensic-science-regulator/about-the-regulator/ndnad-
ethics-group/ 
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We would claim that the research reflected in data-sharing requests, as have been made 
towards the NDNAD 
 
(GeneWatch 2006b: 2-3), could arguably be seen as function creep, 
since research was not one of the original intentions of the NDNAD. In establishing 
procedures for approving such requests, even if after an ethical review, evaluation by an 
ethics committee might serve not only to keep this type of function creep under control; it 
might also be a mechanism that allows it to take place. 
 
Another critical issue is committees‘ composition. Function creep will take place because 
someone considers an expansion beneficial for themselves, for some social group, or for 
society as a whole. Having interviewed stakeholders about the matter it appears that, not 
surprisingly, our informants remain true to their occupational interests. For instance, a 
Norwegian policeman said the following regarding the ethics of familial searching: 
 
”I perceive it as unproblematic to conduct familial searching if it was to become 
available.  That is my conclusion. Because it will be a tool to bring us closer to 
catching the perpetrator. Then we are back to basics: to catch”.   
 
The policeman remained true to his occupational interest, ―to catch criminals‖. Therefore an 
important factor will be the composition of the ethics committee. To have relevance and 
credibility it should consist of people of different backgrounds, stakeholders of differing 
orientation towards forensic DNA questions, e.g. lawyers, privacy-advocates, researchers, 
ethicists.  
 
In Norway, as of now, there is no ethics committee with the remit to oversee the usage of the 
forensic DNA database. It is probably just a matter of time before research requests and 
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requests for new forensic applications, such as those made in the UK, will turn up in Norway 
as well. As the laws on the matter are unclear and there is no ethics committee, the Norwegian 
DNA database remains vulnerable to such requests.  
 
3.4 Control committee? 
While an ethics committee would consider the ethical issues of a DNA-database with the 
intention of evaluating a need before it takes place, a control committee would be mandated to 
oversee that rules and regulations are upheld. While in Norway there is no control committee 
as such, in the UK there is the Custodian. The Custodian is entrusted with maintaining and 
safeguarding the integrity of the NDNAD and developing policy (Nuffield 2007: 93). 
 
Pfeffer‘s point on the role of regulatory bodies would also apply to control committees – they 
might unleash functional expansion as much as rein it in. This can be an effect of 
externalizing responsibility for ethical and legal issues, as illustrated in the following 
interview excerpt. Having discussed moral issues with the interviewer, a policeman said the 
following:  
 
“You have these big moral issues involved, but as a policeman I don‟t think we can go 
too far, as long as we are correctly marshalling ourselves, as long as someone is 
looking at us to make sure we are doing it right. But science will continue to grow, 
won‟t it, and will give even better results of it. (…) I would have an outside body; the 
Majesty‟s Inspectorate. They watch to make sure the police deal with things properly 
and fairly.” 
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This policeman, who doesn‘t see the possibility of the DNA database going too far, claims 
that there should be a control committee to keep an eye so that the police do not misuse the 
DNA database. At the same time, it also shows that the existence of a control committee is 
felt to release the policeman from the responsibility to police himself. 
 
3.5 Sanctions 
One major problem with many laws and regulatory bodies is that they are ineffective in large 
part because they lack sanctions. For instance, in Norway there are many rules governing the 
collection of forensic evidence, yet even illegally collected evidence may be permitted in 
court. This openness for unlawfully collected evidence also encompasses unlawful uses of 
DNA database information. Strandbakken, the leader of the Norwegian White Paper 
committee on expansion of the DNA database, writes: ―Even if a DNA-stain is collected 
contradictory to the Criminal Procedure Act, a Norwegian court will probably not exclude the 
evidence‖ (Strandbakken 2007: 352, our translation). 
  
There have been a number of examples where Norwegian police have used, if not illegal, then 
at least untraditional methods to obtain a DNA profile and search it against the DNA 
database. In one instance, a man the police suspected of a serious crime happened to drown, 
his body thereby arriving at the Institute of Forensic Medicine for an autopsy. This was very 
convenient for the police who, without asking consent of the next of kin, took a sample for 
comparison. This sample exonerated the man, but implicated his brother through familial 
similarities. Another suspect in the same case died of cancer. Here the police requested access 
to tissue samples at the hospital but were turned down. The case went all the way to the 
Supreme Court, which ruled against the police request. This Supreme Court ruling casts the 
use of the drowning victim‘s DNA in a critical light, but did not prevent the use of the 
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evidence in court. Other creative collection methods have also been used. In one case police 
picked up cigarette butts from a person‘s garden. In another a suspect was called in for 
questioning on an unrelated case, one in which he was not a suspect but a witness. In this 
relaxed atmosphere he was served a glass of water which then was used to obtain his DNA 
profile for use in the case in which he was a suspect (Strandbakken 2007). Such creative, and 
some would say illegal, ways of working have however no formal consequences for the 
police.  
 
It is important that sanctions are clear and effective. Additionally, it should also be possible to 
apply these sanctions to both individuals and organizations that are caught misusing data.  
 
3.6 PETs 
 
Even the most effective sanctions, however, primarily come into play after a breach has taken 
place. Before that, they have only a presumed or hoped-for cautionary effect. Another way to 
back up intentions with enforcement is to inscribe (Akrich 1992) the enforcement directly into 
the technology. In the case of DNA databases, privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) might 
be built into the database software.  
 
For instance, in Norway suspects are first entered into an interim suspect database. If 
convicted, their profiles are moved to the permanent database. The Liberal party has proposed 
that juvenile offenders should be taken back off the permanent database if they are not 
convicted of another offence within a certain amount of time. This removal of first time 
offenders could be automated within the data program.  
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There is some legal precedence for demanding the inclusion of PETs within database 
software. In a recent case  -- I v Finland
17
 -- the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
points to the state‘s responsibility to implement effective measures to preserve citizens 
privacy. The state is not only required to punish unauthorized access, or offer compensation 
for injuries as a result of unauthorized access. ―What is required in this connection is practical 
and effective protection to exclude any possibility of unauthorized access occurring in the first 
place‖.18 For the health sector, as this case was based on, this implies effective measures 
within the technical systems to protect a patient‘s privacy.  
 
Of course, just as with the legal and organizational measures proposed above, PETs are not in 
themselves a sufficient guarantee against unwanted function creep. PETs are a ―technological 
fix‖. Technological fixes can be worked around by the technologically competent, while they 
are incomprehensible to most of us, leaving us to either trust or distrust them blindly. 
Therefore they should always be part of a larger package of measures (McCarthy 2008).  
 
3.7. Transparency  
So far we have discussed measures that imply the state watching and controlling itself. 
However, it is a democratic state‘s duty to provide transparency so as to enable the possibility 
of sousveillance (Mann 2002). Sousveillance describes situations where the public watches 
and thereby controls the state by opening up for the possibility to comment and/or object to 
observed practices. Of course, when it comes to forensic technologies, transparency runs up 
against the perceived necessity that police methods be kept secret so as to prevent, or at least 
                                                 
17
 Application no 20511/03, Judgment of 17 July 2008. 
18
 I v Finland, Paragraph 47  
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delay, criminal elements in finding ways to evade them. The problem of transparency 
becomes particularly fraught in connection with data-sharing. 
 
Function creep on DNA databases may take place because new technologies permit 
increasing amounts of data exchange. With such exchange the question of who may have 
access to the information of the DNA database becomes murky. Rules and practices change as 
geographical and organizational distance between practitioners and stakeholders grows, and 
transparency may suffer. To illustrate this regarding forensic DNA databases, we will use the 
Prüm Treaty as an example.  
 
The Prüm Treaty is the first international treaty which arranges an automated cross-border 
matching of biometric data.  
”Prüm, also known as Schengen III, does not only govern the automated searching 
and comparison of police DNA databases for the purpose of criminal investigation, 
but the automated searching of fingerprint data and national vehicle registration data 
for preventive purposes and, in the case of vehicle data, even to track administrative 
offences. Moreover, the Treaty sets out the framework for information exchange to 
prevent „terrorist crime‟ and cross-border police operations such as joint patrols and 
administrative assistance in case of major events or natural disasters” (Töpfer 2008: 
14).  
The Norwegian Minister of Justice, who is currently (September 2008) applying for Norwegian 
membership in the Prüm Treaty, justifies this function creep as follows:  
 
‖Through the DNA-reform and probably Norwegian affiliation to the EU-countries 
DNA-databases through the Prüm Treaty, the government is taking a large step 
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forward in the fight against the internationally branched crime. This is quite 
necessary. We have to build up under international co-operation that will enable us to 
deal with globalised crime (…) We have to show that politics is to be willing, also 
outside the countries borders (…) The development of global trans-boundary crime 
requires this from us‖.19  
 
If Norway is accepted as a member of the Prüm Treaty the use of DNA profiles which were 
given before membership of the treaty was in place will be under the same scrutiny as profiles 
registered after membership, changing what manipulations may be performed on the materials 
and thus changing the ―deal‖ between the registered and the database owner:  
 
―Although the treaty stipulates that database access has to be log-filed and follow 
defined purposes, the automated cross-border exchange of police data is only limited 
by national legal protections, and these differ regarding data protection standards 
and the regulation of DNA analysis and DNA databases.” (Töpfer 2008: 14 ).  
 
In other words, data are managed according to the laws of the country where the data are at 
any given moment. Data used in Norway may have been collected according to laws from 
elsewhere; data gathered in Norway may wind up being stored and used elsewhere according 
to laws Norwegians have little knowledge of or influence over. Note that in the case of 
forensic DNA databases, there is nothing that the registered may do if they disagree with the 
changes. This as opposed to medical databases that are dependent on people‘s willingness to 
contribute samples for both research and storage (Kettis-Lindblad et al 2005: 433) and where 
                                                 
19
 
‖http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dep/Justisminister_Knut_Storberget/taler_artikler/2008/grenselo
s-kriminalitet.html?id=522615 (our translation)  
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people may withdraw their samples if they disagree with what is taking place. This is due to 
the fact that samples are ―given‖ by medical ‖donors‖ but ―taken‖ from ―suspects‖. These 
differences influence how consent, privacy, and autonomy, are presented in the two contexts 
(Johnson and Williams 2004b: 211). Nevertheless, even though ―participation‖ is non-
voluntary – or perhaps all the more so when participation is non-voluntary – issues of trust 
and transparency become important in relationship to forensic DNA databases: ―It is often 
asserted that the maintenance of public confidence, or trust, in the operation of forensic as 
well as medical databases is partly dependent on the openness and transparency of their 
operation‖ (Williams and Johnson 2008: 139). Because the power balance between the 
registered and the owner of the DNA database is not equal, there is a need for the possibility 
of public debate about the uses of forensic DNA databases. This requires transparency. 
Proposed new functions should be widely publicized and accepted by the public before being 
irredeemably entrenched.  It would be important that such reports account for not only what 
has happened in certain high profile cases, but also account for procedures that are used, 
reporting achievements, possible changes in rules and regulations, what new measures may be 
achieved due to technological development, what kind of ethical dilemmas that have arisen 
etc. A British interviewed policeman said the following:  
 
“The fear is the lack of understanding of what the DNA database does now and how 
the DNA database works. And so to allay those fears you‟ve got to make it very public 
about how you are going to use it. And it‟s got to be very transparent, so people can 
be reassured that it is used properly, ethically and in line of what it was designed for.” 
 
UK is attempting transparency when they provide their DNA reports. However it was only 
recently (in 2003) that the first publicly available document was published addressing these 
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issues in relation to the NDNAD (Williams and Johnson 2008: 139). In Norway, so far, no 
such attempts have been made. An interviewed Norwegian policeman, confronted with this 
situation, said, “There you are onto something important.”  However, he also expressed being 
skeptical towards doing too much of it: If one started doing this for DNA there might be a 
transparency function creep and they would have to do it for other policing techniques as 
well, and that might be a difficult one to balance. What has to be kept secret of police working 
methods and how much does the public need to know? That part of police methods should be 
kept secret, however, is not a reason not to publish how the DNA database is being used and 
with what results. ―Where public access is denied for reasons of security and the 
administration of justice, this should be fully explained and justified.‖ (Nuffield 2007: 106) 
 
While the Norwegian system has not implemented practices for reporting usage and 
achievements, the process of expanding the forensic DNA database in 2008 was indeed 
transparent. This is largely due to the Instructions for Official Studies and Reports mentioned 
earlier. In July 2004 the government appointed a committee to consider changes to the 
Norwegian forensic DNA database. A year and a half later this committee delivered a White 
Paper (NOU, 2005:19) discussing a number of issues related to the use of DNA databases in 
criminal law administration, and urging a substantial expansion of the Norwegian forensic 
DNA database. The White Paper was then sent out for consultation to over 50 government 
offices, NGOs and institutions deemed likely to have relevant input on this issue. These 
responded with statements in which they accounted for their opinions on the White Paper and 
its recommendations. Highlights from the approximately 35 statements the ministry deemed 
most important were published (Ot. Prp. Nr. 19). In addition, the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Justice provided a document with its own views on the issue of an expanded 
forensic DNA database (Inst. O. nr 23, 2007). The White Paper, the responses to it and the 
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Standing Committee on Justice document collectively form the background material for 
national debates, for instance in the mass media. 
 
3.8. Limit the potential for function creep – limit database scope  
Whereas some of the safeguards we have discussed above would perhaps be useful for several 
forensic databases, or even for technologies in general, there are aspects of DNA that may 
make it require further, more technology-specific safeguards in relation to function creep. 
DNA possesses properties that may raise further ethical and social concerns than do other 
identification databases or criminal registers. Here we think it is crucial to differentiate 
between the storage of DNA samples and DNA profiles.  
 
A DNA sample is the biological material gathered to determine the identity of the person 
registered, today typically a mouth swab containing cells from an oral cavity. By conducting 
analysis on selected segments of the chromosomes, a DNA profile is obtained. A DNA profile 
is a string of numbers and/or a graphic print of patterns in our DNA. A DNA sample on the 
other hand is part of our body and it is ―entirely possible to sequence a part or all of an 
individual‘s entire genome from their biological sample, and therefore, the retention of 
biological samples requires much greater critical attention and justification‖ (Nuffield 2007: 
54). Aspelenn and Lane (2006:1) claim the uses to which samples can be put subsequent to a 
usable database profile being developed are rarely specifically regulated. This may be due to 
the fact that countries generally fail to identify possible future uses of biological material.  
 
Function creep has already taken its first, but probably not last, step in relation to research on 
DNA databases: According to Genewatch (2006a:8) research has already taken place on the 
NDNAD. This research has ranged from studying the efficiency of the database and the 
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validity of its statistics to developing new commercial products. Research has used both the 
DNA profiles from the database and the stored DNA samples. Obviously this is an extension 
of the use of the NDNAD. The notion of function creep on biological samples was discussed 
in Odelstinget, as witness the question and answer quoted below from members of the 
Standing Committee on Justice: 
  
”Ingrid Heggø (Labour Party): One of the main reasons that we don‟t think the 
biological samples should be retained is that we are afraid they will be used for 
research in the future. When we have such a large database over convicted criminals 
somebody may get tempted to conduct research on them to see if they can find a 
common thing that characterizes a criminal, for example a murderer.  
 What is Fremskrittspartiets (Progress Party‟s20) view on such research today? If they 
are against, why should we believe that they won‟t turn around in a little while in this 
case, like they most often do in other cases?  
   
Solveig Horne (Progress Party): We have an amendment of a law up for hearing 
today where considerations are being made as to whether research should be 
permitted or not. The Progress Party clearly agrees with the proposal that is being 
discussed here today. We are not going to change anything in this round, and we have 
not been given a message from the cabinet minister that there will come a new 
amendment of the law the next years when it comes to this case.”  
 
The introduction made by Heggø illustrates some of the rationale from politicians‘ views for 
not retaining samples. Retention of samples requires that we not only trust the government 
                                                 
20
 A right-wing populist party most known for being against taxes and for restrictions on immigration. 
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today, but also that of tomorrow (since we do not know what will be doable with the genetic 
material in the future). The possibility of data-sharing across borders requires further that we 
trust other governments over whom we hold no democratic sway.  
 
We also see how Horne evades the actual question. She is in no position, nor would 
representatives for any other party be in a position, to make a definitive promise. No party can 
guarantee that they will never accept function creep. This may be one of the reasons why the 
Norwegian Parliament went against what was recommended to them by the DNA-committee, 
and voted against retention of samples. Short of not collecting DNA in the first place, the 
most effective way of limiting research on DNA gathered for forensic uses is to destroy 
samples and only retain profiles. This is also a more permanent way to protect privacy 
(Steinhardt 2004: 190). Limiting the scope of the database in this way implements ―brakes‖ 
and safeguards, allowing more time to reflect what direction it is desirable to move in the 
future. Research will still be possible, just more expensive and laborious as new samples may 
have to be gathered.  
 
Returning to our earlier point about interpretative flexibility being a basic premise for 
function creep: Information is almost limitlessly interpretatively flexible; databases almost 
limitlessly searchable and analyzable. Thus, the best way to limit the function creep of 
information databases is to limit the information they contain. 
 
4. Is there a moral to this story? 
Function creep seems nearly always to take place on surveillance technologies, and as we 
have shown in this article forensic DNA databases are no exception. When additional 
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functions are added to a technology slowly, people will often be less skeptical of the 
development than they might have been had those functions been proposed early on. We can 
already see that our resolve against expanding uses for DNA-technology has been weakened. 
When it is used for one purpose, then another, why should a third matter? ―As Marx warns: 
―Once DNA analysis comes to be seen as a familiar and benign crime control tactic, the way 
will be paved for more controversial uses‖ (Marx 1998). 
 
While forensic DNA databases and function creep on them may contribute to increased 
security, they may also contribute to increased insecurity. Often it comes down to a value 
judgment whether a given function expansion is considered positive or negative. In this 
article, drawing on data from a larger project, we have shown some examples of function 
creep. Looking to the past, present and future we have presented some safeguards that we 
believe should be in place to enable the governing of forensic DNA database functions and 
practices. Clearly none of these safeguards are sufficient on their own; they need to work 
together.  
 
In the UK safeguards in relation to the NDNAD have been developed over the last 13 years, 
and are still being developed. Norway‘s DNA database has a slightly shorter history and is far 
less extensive than the English and Welsh NDNAD, but this is not due to safeguards already 
in place. Instead we see that the safeguards too seem to have developed at a slower pace than 
in the UK. Without effective safeguards in place, we can look to UK practices and see our 
future virtually inscribed … some of it promising, and some of it alarming. Using what 
safeguards we do have available, it is now up to us to mobilize the forces of democratic 
debate. 
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Not only do we need debate; we need that debate to achieve some level of sophistication. 
―[W]hile the technology is still undergoing development, the sophistication of ethical and 
normative debates have not advanced at a similar pace, leaving issues of human rights and 
civil liberties still to be properly accounted for‖ (McCartney 2006: 193). In current debate we 
see that the rhetoric supporting crime prevention initiatives, including function creep on 
existing systems, is often expressed in binary opposites: safety vs. privacy, or security vs. rule 
of law, or suspects‘ rights vs. victims‘ rights (Dahl and Lomell forthcoming). In this article 
we have seen how arguments such as crime prevention, security and safety have trumped 
ethics and human rights issues such as privacy, rule of law and freedom.  
 
Expansion of DNA databases challenges human rights such as the presumption of innocence, 
because the very structure of standard database usage procedures implies that earlier criminals 
are considered probable suspects of future crimes and must ―prove‖ their innocence by not 
matching crime scene samples. Specific DNA database usages entail further ethical 
challenges. Familial searching, for instance, may confront citizens, with previously unknown 
family ties. The use of ethnic inference borders on the ethically dubious practice of racial 
targeting. 
 
McCartney seems pessimistic as to the ability of human societies to rise to these challenges. 
―The protection of the public in risk-averse society will always trump individual rights‖ 
(McCartney 2006: 196). Always? Perhaps. Perhaps social discourse will always fail to 
recognize dangers to human rights, will always slip into a comfortably distanced vision in 
which those dangers only affect the ―Others‖ (i.e. criminals) and never ourselves. So perhaps 
we are being naïve in writing this article, yet it remains our hope that it may help spark a more 
reflective and balanced debate. 
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